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NOTES AND COMMENT
Wick,34 has put aside that fear by showing that the contrary con-
clusion is possible where the Legislature has not yet touched the filial
relation. The court'15 regrets that the decision in Wait v. Pierce6 was
made necessary by statute and concedes that it did somewhat mar the
symmetry and beauty of the family conception. "However, it did not
destroy it" and our court is not disposed "to impair it further than is
necessary to carry out apparent legislative policies."
Until a change is made "under the legislative banner" and by clear
and categorical declaration our court is committed to a reliance upon
the Natural Law as a basis of domestic conduct.
"Honor thy father and thy mother" is an injunction which contains
as much truth today as it did under the Mosaic dispensation.*
J. P. TAUGHER, '27
Principal and Surety: Statute of 'Frauds; Contracts; Perform-
ance.
Plaintiff in the case of Braasch v. Bondel advanced $3,400 to the
principal defendant for the purpose of making a down payment on the
purchase of a property. On November 24, 1919, the defendant ex-
ecuted a note to the plaintiff for the above amount, for one year at
5 per cent interest per annum. The note in question was endorsed by
the other defendants as accommodation parties. The principal de-
fendant paid interest on the note up to November 24, 1921, at which
time a new agreement was formed, whereby the note was extended,
and a higher rate of interest, namely 6 per cent, subsequently 52 per
cent, was to be paid. The arrangement was made without the knowl-
edge or consent of the accommodation parties. The note was later se-
cured by the execution of a second mortgage on the property above
mentioned.
On August 6, 1925, the plaintiff, payee of the note, brought an ac-
tion to foreclose the mortgage, and asked for a deficiency judgment
against the maker and the accommodation parties. The defendant
contends that at the time of the extension of the original note, the
payee had agreed to forbear until the time of the maturity of the first
mortgage on the property which was November 24, 1925. The ac-
commodation parties answered separately, claiming to be released by
the agreement between the debtor and the plaintiff. Last pa),ment of
interest had been made in May, 1925. No payment of interest had
been made for the six months to November, 1925.
The lower court found for the plaintiff, holding the maker of the
note, i.e. the principal defendant, but released the accommodation
1' Supra.
Supra.
Supra.
* Since the above comment went to press the Supreme Court of Iowa, in
Hovey v. Dohnage, et. al., 212 N.W. 553, has decided that a wife may not sue
her husband for personal injuries even though the statute on which the action
was based (sec. io462, Iowa Code, 1924) was one allowing any woman to re-
cover for personal injury from any person, etc. The reasoning is similar to that
in the dissenting opinion in Wait v. Pierce, supra.
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parties. The plaintiff appeals; reversed; holding all defendants liable.
The question primarily involved in this case was whether there had
been such a valid extension of time as would release the sureties. Cit-
ing Fanning v. Murphy2 and Union Nat. Bank v. Cross3 the court said:
Mere forbearance to sue upon an overdue indebtedness, even though there be
a valuable consideration, as for instance here, an increased interest rate, is not
sufficient of itself to operate as a discharge of the sureties or the accommodation
makers ..... In order to effect such result the forbearance must be of and upon
a valid distinct, and definite agreement to forbear.
The only alleged agreement upon which the defendants rely is that
on November 24, 1921, the plaintiff agreed to extend the time of pay-
ment until November 24, 1925. Now on appeal the plaintiff intro-
duces the argument that if such agreement was entered into, it was
void as against the statute of frauds being a contract which by its
terms was not to be performed within one year.
Quoting from the decision, at page 283 N W:
There are opposing views among the authorities on the question as to whether
or not an agreement to pay money is such an agreement as is intended to be
covered by the language of the statute of frauds ..... The weight of the author-
ity, however, is that it is within the statute ..... It was said in Kelly v. Thomp-
son-,' "an oral contract for the payment of money, which is, by the terms of the
contract, to be paid more than one year after the date thereof, is within the sta-
tute -of frauds, although the consideration is delivered at the date of the con-
tract."
and further:
The question has not been squarely passed on in this state, although language
has been used in several decisions which seem to require the conclusion that it
is the law here that such agreements do not require to be in writing, although
not to be performed within the year.
In Phillips v. Holland5 $17.50 was paid at the time of the making
of the oral agreement and the court there held, that such a prepay-
ment of interest was sufficient execution of an oral contract so as to
take it out of the statute of frauds. The court there said: "The fact
that it was not in writing does not affect its validity."
The case of Grace v. Lynch held that the prepayment of interest is
such execution as would take a contract out of the operation of the
statute of frauds. The payment of interest before due, is held to be
analagous to the situation of an oral sale of goods which is rescued
from the operation of the statute by the delivery of the goods. At
page 169 we have:
Was, then, the agreement void, under the statute of frauds, because not in
writing, and not to be performed within one year from the making thereof? This
new contract was entirely executed on the part of the defendants by the payment
of interest ..... .This court is fully committed to the doctrine that such a
contract is not within the statute.
2 126 Wis. 538; 105 N.W. io56.
3 100 Wis. 174; 75 N.W. 992.
'175 Mass. 427; 56 N.E. 713.
5 149 Wis. 524; 136 N.W. 191.
'8o Wis. 166; 49 N.W. 751.
NOTES AND COMMENT
In Fischer v. Stevens7 cited in Phillips v. Holland, supra, we again
find the situation of an entirely executed contract and a consequent
holding that the involved contract is outside the operation of the statute
of frauds. Here an equitable defense was interposed which involved
an oral extension of time. The plaintiff in this case agreed to extend
the indebtedness if the debtor would give him a note for an acquired
claim and a judgment which the plaintiff had against the debtor. The
court says at page 771:
But the rule in this state and the decided weight of authority seem to be that
an agreement made after the note becomes due, for'its extension after a definite
time, when supported by a valuable consideration, as in this case, and is otherwise
valid [italics, mine] though verbal may be interposed as a bar to an action on
the note or mortgage, brought within that time.
It then seems that none of the cited cases are precisely in point.
In the present case, the last payment of interest had not been paid.
It therefore was not an executed contract,. and the Court,
Not being bound by any former rulings of this court to the contrary, we,
therefore, feel free to follow that which seems to be the better reason and logic,
namely, that the statute of frauds in question, making void contracts not to be
performed within a year and not in writing, apply to just such contracts as are
here involved; namely, those extending the time of the payment of a promissory
note.
The Court in coming to this conclusion, apparently clarifies the
law as regards contracts for the payment of money which by their
.terms is not to be performed within a year. It would seem that such
contracts are within the operation of the statute unless rescued there-
from by performance; and such performance must be a complete
execution of the consideration on one side. Thus, prepayment of in-
terest, payment of interest when not yet due, or any other act totally
executed which provides consideration for an oral extension of time
for more than one year removes the entire contract from the opera-
tion of the statute of frauds.
CHARLES L. GOLDBERG
Wills: Undue influence; bequest in favor of one occupying'a
confidential relationship with testator.
The recent case of In re Weaver's Estate,' is the latest addition to
the long" line of Wisconsin cases which protect the aged and infirm
desirous of making wills from the unlawful solicitations of their rel-
atives. The right to dispose of property by will is one of the oldest
- rights known to law and is one of the rights which the law most zeal-
ously guards. In this most recent case the testator made a will in
which he gave 12o acres of land to one son, Robert, forty acres to
the contestant, his son, Louis, and forty acres to his daughter. The
personal property was divided equally among the three children. By
a codicil executed about two months before his death he gave the
same 12o acres to Robert and the other eighty to his daughter. The
1 43 Mo. 18I; 44 S.W. 769.
'- Wis. -; 2IH N.W. 130.
